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Abstract
Background: Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopmental condition with key deficits in social
functioning. It is widely assumed that the biological underpinnings of social impairment are neurofunctional
alterations in the “social brain,” a neural circuitry involved in inferring the mental state of a social partner. However,
previous evidence comes from small-scale studies and findings have been mixed. We therefore carried out the to-
date largest study on neural correlates of mentalizing in ASD.
Methods: As part of the Longitudinal European Autism Project, we performed functional magnetic resonance
imaging at six European sites in a large, well-powered, and deeply phenotyped sample of individuals with ASD (N =
205) and typically developing (TD) individuals (N = 189) aged 6 to 30 years. We presented an animated shapes task
to assess and comprehensively characterize social brain activation during mentalizing. We tested for effects of age,
diagnosis, and their association with symptom measures, including a continuous measure of autistic traits.
Results: We observed robust effects of task. Within the ASD sample, autistic traits were moderately associated with
functional activation in one of the key regions of the social brain, the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. However, there
were no significant effects of diagnosis on task performance and no effects of age and diagnosis on social brain
responses. Besides a lack of mean group differences, our data provide no evidence for meaningful differences in
the distribution of brain response measures. Extensive control analyses suggest that the lack of case-control
differences was not due to a variety of potential confounders.
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Conclusions: Contrary to prior reports, this large-scale study does not support the assumption that altered social
brain activation during mentalizing forms a common neural marker of ASD, at least with the paradigm we
employed. Yet, autistic individuals show socio-behavioral deficits. Our work therefore highlights the need to
interrogate social brain function with other brain measures, such as connectivity and network-based approaches,
using other paradigms, or applying complementary analysis approaches to assess individual differences in this
heterogeneous condition.
Keywords: Autism, Autism spectrum disorder, Social brain, fMRI, Mentalizing, Theory of mind, Animated shapes,
Development, Multi-site
Background
Atypicalities in social communication and interaction
are a hallmark of autism spectrum disorder (ASD), a
neurodevelopmental condition with onset in early child-
hood. The ability to recognize the mental state of a so-
cial partner, also referred to as theory of mind (ToM),
has long been posited to be altered in autism in the
“mind-blindness” account of ASD [1]. These deficits are
suggested to be exacerbated during on-line mentalizing,
e.g., during the instantaneous use of ToM in real-life so-
cial interactions, while impairments in explicit mentaliz-
ing, such as the instructed reasoning about mental
states, can be related to (and compensated by) executive
function abilities [2–6].
The mind-blindness account has stimulated a line of
imaging research to explore the potential neurobio-
logical underpinnings of mentalizing, and of social cog-
nition in general, in ASD. In a seminal paper, Castelli
and colleagues [7] presented short animations of geo-
metric shapes whose movement patterns prompted
mental state attribution (e.g., a triangle mocking another
triangle [8]). In contrast to false-belief tasks, where the
mental state of a social agent can be deduced by logical
inference based on a given scenario, the animated shapes
draw upon our irresistible tendency to attribute mental
states—even to non-living beings devoid of facial or
other human-like cues—in the very moment of watching
[8, 9]. The authors found reduced activation in a sample
of 10 adult ASD participants in regions of the so-called
social brain, a neural network that is commonly acti-
vated in tasks involving mentalizing, especially the pos-
terior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), extending into
the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), and the dorsome-
dial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC [10]). This hypoactivation
was paralleled by less accurate verbal descriptions of
ToM animations. The authors suggested that mentaliz-
ing deficits in ASD might originate from a failure to ad-
equately extract and process social meaning from
sensory input. If validated in large samples, social brain
responses to animated shapes could be exploited for bio-
markers related to diagnosis, stratification, and/or treat-
ment prognosis in ASD [11].
Numerous imaging studies on social cognition in ASD
have since been performed. Here, the use of a wide var-
iety of tasks and analysis procedures across different
samples has resulted in a heterogeneous picture of neu-
rofunctional alterations in ASD that are at times contra-
dictory to the findings by Castelli et al. [7]. For instance,
among those studies that employed an animated shapes
task, methodological differences include (a) variations in
ASD sample composition (e.g., 10 adults [mean age 33 ±
7.6 years, sex not specified] in [7]; 12 adolescents/adults
[15 to 35 years, 2 females] in [12]; 13 adolescents [10 to
16 years, 2 females] in [13]; 17 adolescents/adults [13 to
23 years, 4 females] in [14]), (b) differences in imaging
data analysis (e.g., different preprocessing routines with
smoothing kernels ranging from 4.5 mm in [14] to 16
mm in [7], significance assessment on the whole-brain
level [7, 12, 13] and/or within regions of interest [13,
14]), and even (c) differences in imaging modality (posi-
tron emission imaging in [7], fMRI in [12–14]). These
and other studies on social cognition have produced
mixed conclusions on ASD-related effects, ranging from
reduced to excess activation in different brain regions
within or outside the social brain, or no effect at all. In
order to detect converging evidence, systematic meta-
analyses have been performed but results vary with the
studies included (e.g., [15–19]). Thus, while several can-
didate regions such as the medial prefrontal cortex,
pSTS, amygdala, insula, fusiform face area, and inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG) have been highlighted in the context
of altered social information processing in ASD, the
overall picture remains inconclusive.
An important source of variance in the ASD imaging
literature is age, which needs to be addressed explicitly
when studying developmental samples. The literature
points to higher activation of frontal areas during adoles-
cence compared to adulthood in typically developing in-
dividuals, which might reflect ongoing prefrontal
maturation and less efficient inhibitory control in adoles-
cence [20, 21]. However, this effect is not specific for so-
cial cognition and more research is warranted to address
the effect of age on social brain function and its inter-
action with the autistic condition.
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More recently, large-scale multicenter studies have
been launched using more representative samples with
higher statistical power. These have so far been limited
to resting state imaging data [22, 23] which do not allow
to draw conclusions on time-locked functional responses
to external stimuli or task demands.
We have therefore extended previous large-scale ef-
forts to include brain activation measures in the Longi-
tudinal European Autism Project (LEAP [24]) where a
well-powered, representative, and deeply phenotyped
sample of participants with ASD and typically develop-
ing (TD) individuals has been characterized from child-
hood to adulthood. This unique cohort allows to address
several key limitations of earlier studies, such as small
sample size and low statistical power [25], restriction to
specific age ranges, exclusion of the broader autism
phenotype involving comorbidities, and limited clinical,
psychological, and biological characterization for stratifi-
cation analysis. In the current study, our aim was to dis-
cover and validate neurofunctional markers of social
cognition alterations in ASD as a first step for biomarker
discovery. The animated shapes task was chosen as one
of four neurocognitive paradigms in this large study,
given the promising findings in earlier reports that sug-
gest high construct validity for on-line mentalizing defi-
cits in ASD [7, 26, 27], and due to its good applicability
across age ranges and intellectual abilities. Here, we used
an adapted version of the task [27] that was recently
shown to have reproducible effects on functional activa-
tion [28] and to be sensitive for autism-related traits
[29]. Functional responses were comprehensively
assessed as changes in brain activation and related to
age and clinical status. We also undertook a dimensional
analysis approach to investigate the influence of autism-
related traits on social brain development. We expected
individuals with ASD or with higher autism-related traits
to show reduced regional activation in key areas of the
social brain in response to the animated shapes [7, 13,
14]. Regarding the effect of age independent from diag-
nostic group, we expected younger participants to show
higher frontal activation, reflecting a stronger involve-
ment of areas implicated in executive control [20, 21].
Methods
Sample
Participants were part of EU-AIMS LEAP, a large multi-
center European initiative aimed at the identification of
biomarkers in ASD [24]. The study comprises 437 indi-
viduals with ASD and 300 TD individuals, both males
and females, aged between 6 and 30 years. Participants
underwent comprehensive clinical, cognitive, and MRI
assessment at one of the following six centers: Institute
of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience, King’s Col-
lege London, UK; Autism Research Centre, University of
Cambridge, UK; Radboud University Nijmegen Medical
Centre, the Netherlands; University Medical Centre Ut-
recht, the Netherlands; Central Institute of Mental
Health, Mannheim, Germany; and University Campus
Bio-Medico of Rome, Italy. The study was approved by
the local ethical committees of participating centers, and
written informed consent was obtained from all partici-
pants or their legal guardians (for participants < 18
years). Individuals with ASD were included in the ASD
sample based on an existing clinical diagnosis according
to DSM-IV [30], DSM-IV-TR [31], DSM-5 [32], or ICD-
10 [33]. Given the better accuracy of clinical judgments
[34], individuals with ASD were not excluded if they did
not reach the cutoff scores on the Autism Diagnostic
Observation Schedule (ADOS [35]) or the Autism Diag-
nostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R [36]) during clinical
characterization. For further details about inclusion and
exclusion criteria and for a comprehensive clinical
characterization of the LEAP cohort, we refer to Char-
man et al. [37]. For further details on the study design,
we refer to Loth et al. [24]. In the present study, we se-
lected all participants with an IQ > 75 for whom a struc-
tural and the task fMRI scan were available (nTD = 231,
nASD = 273). Participants with structural anomalies (n =
8), an incomplete task fMRI scan (n = 5), excessive head
motion during the task fMRI scan (n = 74; defined as
more than 20% of frames with a framewise displacement
(FD) > 0.5 mm; Jenkinson et al. [38]), incomplete infor-
mation (n = 11), and/or corrupted datasets due to tech-
nical failure (n = 16) were excluded. This resulted in the
inclusion of 394 individuals, 205 individuals with ASD
and 189 TD individuals, in our analyses (see Table 1 for
an overview over key descriptive variables for the full
sample, and Additional file 1: Table S1 for a sample de-
scription split by age group). Standard operation and
quality control procedures are detailed in Additional file
1.
Power analysis
We performed a power analysis for our sample using
GPower [42] to assess statistical sensitivity to detect
an effect of group (TD vs. ASD) or an effect of age
in a single hypothesis test (e.g., single voxel or region
of interest) at a type I error rate of α = .05 while ac-
counting for covariates of no interest (sex and site,
see below; statistical test in GPower: linear multiple
regression, fixed model, R2 increase; number of tested
predictors, 1; total number of predictors, 8). Based on
this model, the study has a power of 80% to detect a
standardized effect size of f2 ≥ .02 and a power of
95% to detect a standardized effect size of f2 ≥ .03,
with f2 ≥ .02 denoting a small effect and f2 ≥ .15 de-
noting a medium effect [43]. In addition, with our
large sample of N > 400, this study is less prone to
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false positives and overestimation of effect sizes, in
particular in the scenario of weak diffuse effects
which is typical for task fMRI [44].
Clinical measures
Participants in the ASD group had an existing clinical
diagnosis of ASD according to the DSM-IV-TR/ICD-
10 or DSM-5 criteria. ASD symptoms were
comprehensively assessed using the Autism Diagnostic
Interview-Revised (ADI-R [36]) and Autism Diagnostic
Observation Schedule 2 (ADOS-2 [35]). In the current
sample, 85% of ASD individuals met the diagnostic
threshold on the ADI-R or ADOS-2, while 49 % met
the cutoff on both instruments. Individuals who did
not reach the cutoff on either scale were included on
the basis of careful clinical judgment made by expert
Table 1 Sample description
ASD TD Statistics: ASD vs. TD
Total n 205 189
Demographics
Sex (male/female) 151/54 123/66 χ2(1) = 3.42, p = .079
Age (years) 17.9 ± 5.4 (7.1–30.6) 18.0 ± 5.5 (7.6–31.0) t(392) = .32, p = .749
IQ (full IQ) 107.1 ± 14.2 (75.6–148.0) 108.5 ± 12.1 (76.8–142.0) t(390) = 1.05, p = .295
Handedness (right/left/ambidext/unknown) 146/22/8/29 131/16/4/38 χ2(3) = 3.66, p = .301
Medication use (% of subjects)1 40.5 5.8 χ2(1) = 62.37, p < .001
In-scanner performance
Mean framewise displacement (FD; in mm)2 .14 ± .08 (.03–.47) .12 ± .08 (.03–.42) t(392) = 1.88, p = .061
Volumes with FD > 0.5 mm (%) 3.55 ± 4.74 (0–19.40) 3.17 ± 4.33 (0–19.73) t(392) = .82, p = .412
Signal-to-noise ratio 9.7 ± 1.3 (6.5–13.8) 9.9 ± 1.4 (6.5–13.8) t(392) = 1.42, p = .155
Task accuracy .81 ±.13 (.33–1.0) .83 ± .13 (0–1.0) t(392) = 1.30, p = .194
Clinical characteristics
ADI-R3
Social interaction 15.5 ± 6.7 (0–29)
Communication 12.6 ± 5.6 (0–26)
RRB 4.5 ± 2.6 (0–12)
ADOS-24
Social affect 5.7 ± 2.5 (1–10)
RRB 4.7 ± 2.6 (1–10)
Total 5.0 ± 2.6 (1–10)
SRS-2 (parent report)5
Raw score 86.1 ± 30.6 (21–163) 19.9 ± 14.4 (1–74) t(245) = 19.07, p < .001
T score 69.2 ± 12.1 (43–90) 45.1 ± 5.8 (37–66) t(245) = 17.54, p < .001
DAWBA comorbidities6
ADHD symptoms 1.6 ± 1.6 (0–5) .2 ± .7 (0–3) t(211) = 7.25, p < .001
Depression symptoms 1.1 ± 1.3 (0–5) .4 ± .7 (0–4) t(311) = 5.66, p < .001
Anxiety symptoms 2.5 ± 1.3 (0–5) 1.2 ± .9 (0–4) t(348) = 11.06, p < .001
Participant characteristics, split by sample and age group. If not otherwise indicated, numbers reflect mean ± standard deviation, followed by value
range (minimum–maximum)
1Percentage of participants taking medication prescribed for behavioral or neurological problems. Medication data was available for 132 ASD and 78 TD
participants. See Additional file 1: Table S1 more information on medication
2Motion was assessed as mean framewise displacement according to [38]
3Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R [36]) scores were computed for reciprocal interaction (social interaction), communication, and restrictive, repetitive
stereotyped behaviors and interests (RRB). ADI-R scores reflect historical symptom severity (age 4–5 years) and were available for 197 ASD participants
4Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule 2 (ADOS-2 [35]). Calibrated severity scores [39] were computed for social affect, RRB, and the overall total score. ADOS-2
scores reflect current symptom severity and were available for 198 ASD participants
5Total raw and total T score (sex and age normalized) on the Social Responsiveness Scale-2 (SRS-2 [40]). SRS-2 scores were available for 247 participants (i.e., TD
adults are excluded from this measure; see Additional file 1 for analyses using self-reported SRS-2 scores). The raw SRS-2 scores were used in our analyses
6Comorbid symptoms of ADHD, depression, and anxiety were assessed with the Development and Well-Being Assessment (DAWBA [41]), generating six levels
(ordinal scores 0 to 5) of prediction of the probability of a disorder (~ 0.1%, ~ 0.5%, ~ 3%, ~ 15%, ~ 50%, > 70%). DAWBA scores were available for 167 ASD and
146 TD participants for depression, 140 ASD and 73 TD participants for ADHD, and 183 ASD and 167 TD participants for anxiety
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clinicians in the participating ASD specialist centers.
We used the parent-reported total raw score on the
Social Responsiveness Scale Second Edition (SRS-2
[40]) as a continuous measure for autism traits across
all participants. The SRS-2 allows for the assessment
of autism traits across clinical and non-clinical sam-
ples and includes 65 questions about autistic behav-
iors, generating scores ranging from 0 to 195, with
higher scores indicating the presence of pronounced
traits. This measure was available for all ASD and TD
individuals except for TD adults where only the self-
report was assessed. Analyses on SRS-2 scores includ-
ing TD adults are presented in Additional file 1.
Task
We assessed functional brain responses during an
adapted version of the animated shapes task [27, 29]
used in Castelli et al. [7] which was presented as part of
a structural and functional imaging battery [24]. The
task consisted of short video clips (26 to 48 s) featuring
two triangles whose movement patterns reflected in-
creasing levels of mental state attribution according to
three conditions: (1) no or little mental state attribution
for random movement (e.g., floating around), (2) percep-
tion of agency and hence of mental states for goal-
directed movement (e.g., chasing), and (3) perception of
complex mental states involving theory of mind (e.g.,
cheating). Four videos per condition were presented in a
pseudorandomized order, with no more than two anima-
tions of the same condition presented in a row. Partici-
pants passively watched each video clip. In the
subsequent response phase (5 s), participants were asked
to categorize the animation to one of the three condi-
tions by selecting the corresponding icon by button
press. Selected icons were highlighted by a red frame for
the duration of 1 s, followed by a fixation cross and a
variable jitter (M = 996ms, SD = 418ms). No feedback
on categorization accuracy was given. The prompted
categorization during fMRI deviated from the procedure
in Castelli et al. where subjects gave verbal descriptions,
i.e., narratives, after each animation. The categorization
used in the current study has previously been shown to
be a sensitive and objective test of on-line mentalizing
with the advantage of a faster assessment and more ob-
jective analysis of the participant’s response [27]. Partici-
pants were familiarized to the task in a standardized
training session before scanning, including three practice
video clips. Task performance during the fMRI scan was
evaluated in terms of overall categorization accuracy and
accuracy of ToM video categorization (see Additional
file 1 for additional age group-specific analyses). Ana-
lyses were performed in SPSS (IBM, version 22) using
univariate analyses of covariance to assess the effects of
diagnosis and age while controlling for sex, site, and IQ.
See Additional file 1 for more details on stimuli, trial
structure, and task instruction.
MRI data acquisition
Data were acquired on 3-T MRI scanners, and acquisi-
tion protocols were harmonized across sites as closely as
possible. Functional data was collected using an echo-
planar imaging (EPI) sequence, and structural images
were acquired with a high-resolution T1-weighted
magnetization-prepared rapid gradient echo sequence.
Data were subjected to an extensive quality assessment
pipeline. Detailed information on scanning parameters
and data quality control procedures is given in Add-
itional file 1.
fMRI data analysis
Preprocessing
Functional imaging data were preprocessed using stand-
ard analysis routines implemented in SPM12 (http://
www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/), including slice-time correc-
tion, a two-step realignment procedure, unified segmen-
tation and normalization to standard stereotactic space
as defined by the Montreal Neurological Institute
(MNI), and smoothing with an 8-mm full-width-at-half-
maximum Gaussian Kernel.
Subject-level activation analysis
Task conditions were modeled as boxcar functions that
accounted for the presentation of videos and its para-
metric modulation. Increasing values of the parametric
modulator (i.e., 1, 2, and 3) coded for increasing menta-
lizing demands in random, goal-directed, and ToM con-
ditions, respectively. This approach deviates from
previous ASD studies where the ToM condition was
compared to the low-level baseline condition (i.e., ran-
dom movement) while ignoring the goal-directed condi-
tion [7, 12, 13, 28, 29, 45, 46]. The current approach
comes with the advantage that it draws on all available
data, thereby maximizing statistical power and aligning
with the assumption of a gradual increase of mentalizing
demands across conditions [26]. We additionally mod-
eled task effects of no interest, i.e., response selection
and execution during video categorization, with boxcar
functions of variable durations depending on the partici-
pant’s response time. Task regressors were convolved
with the canonical hemodynamic response function
(HRF) and subjected as predictors to a general linear
model (GLM), along with six realignment parameters to
account for head motion. During first-level model esti-
mation, data was high-pass filtered with a cutoff of 256 s,
and an autoregressive model of the first order was ap-
plied. To identify brain responses reflecting sensitivity to
social significance, the effect of the parametric modula-
tor was contrasted to the implicit baseline.
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We additionally tested for case-control differences in
brain activation obtained from the original approach
where animations were modeled as boxcar functions and
assigned to three condition-specific regressors of interest
(random, goal-directed, ToM). All remaining steps of
model specification and estimation were identical. Indi-
vidual contrast images were calculated for the contrast
ToM > random and ToM > goal-directed, respectively.
Group-level statistical inference
Resulting contrast images were subjected to a GLM to
assess the within-subject effect of task and the between-
subject effects of diagnosis and age while controlling for
effects of sex and site. Age-by-diagnosis interactions
were tested in an additional GLM. To assess the effect of
autism traits, SRS-2 raw scores were added as an add-
itional covariate in a separate model. Note that group
was accounted for in this model, which ensures that ef-
fects were not driven by a mere difference in group
means. In order to account for between-subject effects
that specifically occur during development or only
emerge in adulthood, two subsamples were defined: a
youth sample (< 18 years) and an adult sample (≥ 18
years). All analyses were repeated separately in both sub-
samples. Across analyses, effects were evaluated at a stat-
istical threshold of p = 0.05, family-wise error corrected
(FWE) on a voxel level across the whole brain and
within the combined mask of the right pSTS and dmPFC
using small volume correction (SVC; 503 voxels). Case-
control analyses were complemented by tests for equal-
ity of distribution at selected peak voxels, using the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with a significance level of α
= .05 implemented as the ks2stat function in Matlab
(version R2018b, The MathWorks, Inc.).
Control analyses
We performed control analyses to investigate whether
the results were affected by various potentially influen-
cing variables, such as demographic (acquisition site, IQ)
and clinical characteristics (medication, comorbidity,
current diagnostic status), task performance
(categorization accuracy), functional image quality (mo-
tion and signal-to-noise ratio), and SRS informant (SRS
self-report, available for adults in the ASD groups and
for adolescents and adults in the TD group). We also ex-
plored whether ASD-related effects were modulated by
sex (i.e., sex by diagnosis interaction). Finally, we tested
whether functional brain activation related to the
participants’ categorization performance. See Additional
file 1 for details on all control analyses.
Narrative performance
Following Castelli and colleagues [7], we assessed verbal
descriptions of the animations as an additional behav-
ioral measure. These narratives might be particularly
sensitive to spontaneous mentalizing since participants
are not explicitly prompted to categorize the animation.
Narratives were assessed for the same animations in a
separate cognitive test session that preceded the fMRI
scanning on a separate day. In order to minimize partici-
pant burden, 10 animations were used (4× ToM, 4× GD,
2× random). In short, participants were asked to spon-
taneously describe what was happening in each anima-
tion while watching. The responses were audio typed
and analyzed based on a standardized scoring system
(see Additional file 1). Here, we use the participant’s
mentalizing score which reflects the use of mental state
terms (score of 0: absence of any mental state term,
score of 1: terms that denote intentionality, e.g., “the tri-
angle chases the other triangle,” score of 2: terms that
denote interactions involving theory of mind, e.g., “the
small triangle tries to convince the big triangle to go
out”). The mentalizing score therefore parallels the three
task conditions and can thus be compared to the
categorization performance during fMRI scanning.
Results
Behavioral performance
Statistical information on categorization performance
during fMRI scanning is detailed in Table 2. Diagnostic
groups did not differ in overall categorization accuracy
or ToM video categorization accuracy. In contrast, we ob-
served an effect of age, with better performance in older
subjects. Due to the skewed distribution of values, non-
parametric correlations with age are reported in Fig. 1.
Similarly to categorization performance, behavioral
performance on the narratives (i.e., mean mentalizing
scores for the three conditions) did not differ between
cases and controls, irrespective of age (F(1,338) ≤ 1.00, p ≥
.318). We performed a mixed multilevel analysis to test
the association between fMRI categorization and menta-
lizing ratings along with the influence of diagnostic sta-
tus and age while controlling for sex and site. Results
suggest a significant association between categorization
and mentalizing scores (t = 20.798, p < .001), with no ef-
fect of age (t = 1.632, p = .103) or diagnosis (t = .71, p =
Table 2 Video categorization accuracy for the full sample, youth sample (< 18 years of age), and adult sample (≥ 18 years of age)
Accuracy (in %) ASD TD ME diagnosis ME age IA age × diagnosis
Overall 81.4 ± 13.4 83.2 ± 13.4 F(1,381) = .383, p = .536 F(1,381) = 20.220, p < .001 F(1,381) = .727, p = .394
ToM video 82.7 ± 20.5 86.2 ± 19.0 F(1,381) = 2.181, p = .141 F(1,381) = 28.377, p < .001 F(1,381) = .097, p = .755
Significant effects printed in bold; ASD autism spectrum disorder, TD typical development, ME main effect, IA interaction effect
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.478). We additionally tested how well mean
categorization accuracy corresponded to mean mentaliz-
ing scores for ToM animations. Due to the low range of
possible values, non-parametric correlation analysis was
used, which suggested a significant association (Kendall’s
tau = .145, p = .001; Spearman’s rho = .171, p = .001).
Brain activation
Increasing mentalizing demands across conditions led to
robust activation of key regions of the social brain, in-
cluding pSTS and dmPFC, as predicted (Fig. 2a, Table 3,
Additional file 1: Figure S3 and S4). We observed dis-
tinct effects of age in the full and youth samples (Fig.
2b). While activation in the right anterior temporal sul-
cus and temporal pole decreased across the full age
range (6–30 years), a specific decrease of activation was
detected in the youth sample (6–18 years) in regions typ-
ically involved in the dorsal and ventral attention net-
works (e.g., frontal eye fields, intraparietal sulcus,
anterior insula).
In the categorical analyses, brain responses to in-
creasing mentalizing demands did not differ between
diagnostic groups on the whole-brain level and
within ROIs across age groups (ROI statistics for
the full sample are as follows: right pSTS, main ef-
fect of diagnostic group: F ≤ 3.11, pFWE (SVC) ≥
.949, diagnostic group × age interaction: F ≤ 6.35,
pFWE (SVC) ≥ .520; dmPFC, main effect of diagnos-
tic group: F ≤ 4.34, pFWE (SVC) ≥ .828; diagnostic
group × age interaction: F ≤ 7.33, pFWE (SVC) >
.379). Cases and controls did not differ in the distri-
bution of functional responses in selected peak
voxels (see Fig. 2; all p > .05), and visual inspection
of distributions did not suggest the formation of
meaningful subgroups.
In contrast, the dimensional analysis uncovered an in-
crease in dmPFC responses with increasing autism traits
(full sample: peak voxel at x = 3, y = 62, z = 23; t = 3.88,
pFWE (SVC) = .011). This effect was driven by the ASD
group (statistical analysis on peak voxel estimate in ASD
group: F(1,150) = 14.53, p < .001; in TD group: F(1,77) =
.04, p = .841; Fig. 3a). See Table 3 for a detailed list of
brain regions, coordinates, and statistics.
Our additional analyses involving the ToM > ran-
dom contrast did not yield any case-control differ-
ence on the whole-brain level and within regions of
interest across samples (all pFWE > .277). The con-
trast involving the high-level baseline condition
(ToM > goal-directed) revealed a small cluster
within the dmPFC in the youth sample where indi-
viduals with ASD showed a stronger response com-
pared with TD individuals (peak voxel at x = 9, y =
50, z = 26; F = 13.56, pFWE (SVC) = .034; Fig. 3b).
No other cluster emerged across search masks and
samples (all pFWE > .251). Dimensional analyses
using these contrasts replicated the association
within the dmPFC observed in the parametric
modulation approach (ToM > random, full sample:
peak voxel at x = 3, y = 62, z = 23; t = 3.35, pFWE
(SVC) = .057; youth sample: peak voxel at x = 15, y
= 50, z = 35; t = 4.20, pFWE (SVC) = .004). See
Additional file 1: Table S4 for a full list of categor-
ical and dimensional effects for the specific
contrasts.
Fig. 1 Overall categorization accuracy. Linear least square regression fits (third level polynomial) for TD (gray) and ASD (black) are shown for the
full sample. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals. Non-parametric correlation coefficients (Spearman’s rho) are reported for all
subjects and separately for TD and ASD subjects.*p < .05, **p < .01
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Control analyses
The between-subject effects of age and diagnosis re-
ported above were largely robust to the inclusion of add-
itional control variables. As a notable exception, we
observed an influence of site on the association between
dmPFC and autism traits; the association dropped below
the significance threshold when skipping one of the
major contributing sites (KCL). The direction of the
Fig. 2 Functional activation to spontaneous mentalizing elicited by increasing social significance of animated video clips. a Render brains
illustrate the positive effect of task (i.e., effect of increasing social significance) in the full sample. Scatter plots highlight functional responses in
selected peak voxels in the right pSTS (left) and dmPFC (right). b Render brains illustrate the positive effect of age in the full sample (left) and
youth sample (right), complemented by scatter plots of peak voxels in the right anterior temporal pole (left) and right anterior insula (right).
Associations with age are displayed using a linear model fit (95% confidence interval indicated as shaded area). Distributions of peak voxel
activation in cases and controls were compared using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which suggested no evidence for unequal distributions
(statistics for peak at [57, − 46, 11], full sample: D(205,189)* = .065, p = .789; for peak at [− 6, 53, 32], full sample: D(205,189)* = .044, p = .990, for peak
at [51, 2, − 19], full sample: D(205,189)* = .061, p = .853; for peak at [30, 20, − 4], youth sample: D(111,105)* = .081, p = .855; adult sample: D(93,84)* =
.140, p = .327). Distribution mean and 25th/75th percentiles are indicated as thick and thin lines within bee swarm plots, respectively. For
illustration purposes, render brains are displayed at a significance threshold of t = 3 using BrainNet Viewer (http://www.nitrc.org/projects/bnv/).
TD, typically developing; ASD, autism spectrum disorder; D*, test statistic of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
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association, however, did not change (Additional file 1:
Figure S5). Follow-up analyses suggest that the KCL site
effect is most plausibly explained by the fact that the
KCL site contributed a (relatively) higher number of
(relatively) more severely affected individuals with ASD,
which boosted the association between dmPFC activa-
tion and autism trait scores. Regarding effects of medica-
tion, the exclusion of medicated individuals resulted in
an attenuation of the dimensional effect in the dmPFC,
which however could not be attributed to symptom se-
verity. The direct comparison of medicated and unmedi-
cated individuals with ASD revealed a diminished
response of the insula and inferior frontal cortex in med-
icated children and adolescents (Additional file 1: Figure
S6). No effects were observed within the canonical social
brain network. We also did not observe a modulation of
Fig. 3 a Brain sections (left) illustrate the association of a continuous measure of autism traits, as assessed as parent-reported scores of the Social
Responsiveness Scale-2 (SRS-2), with functional responses to increasing mentalizing demands in the dmPFC in individuals with ASD. The outline
of the ROI in the dmPFC is displayed in blue. A scatter plot (right) demonstrates the distribution of autism trait scores and peak voxel activation
in cases and controls, including linear model fits for each group. The 95% confidence interval for the significant linear model fit in the ASD group
is displayed in gray. b Brain sections (left) illustrate the case-control difference for the specific contrast ToM > goal-directed in the dmPFC ROI
(outlined in blue) in the youth sample. Scatter plots (right) display the distributions of peak voxel contrast estimates in the youth and adult
sample, with mean and inner quartiles (25th to 75th percentile) indicated as thick and thin lines, respectively
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Table 3 Whole-brain parametric effects of increasing mentalizing demands on brain activation
Effect/contrast Sample k Region x y z t pcorr
Within-subject effects
Effect of task
Mentalizing demands: parametric
increase
Full 3036 Superior temporal gyrus 57 −
46
11 28.69 < .001
Middle occipital gyrus [area hOc4lp] 27 −
91
2 24.99 < .001
Superior temporal gyrus 48 −
22
− 7 22.04 < .001
Inferior temporal gyrus [area FG4] 42 −
52
−
13
21.25 < .001
Temporal pole 54 14 −
19
16.71 < .001
4251 Middle temporal gyrus −
54
−
52
14 26.84 < .001
Middle occipital gyrus [area hOc4lp] −
27
−
91
− 4 23.03 < .001
Fusiform gyrus [area FG4] −
39
−
55
−
10
21.55 < .001
Cerebellum [lobule VIIa crusI (hem)] −
24
−
76
−
34
16.49 < .001
Inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis −
51
20 20 16.40 < .001
1115 Precuneus 6 −
52
38 18.85 < .001
868 Inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis [area
45]
51 26 17 14.96 < .001
Precentral gyrus 45 5 50 12.57 < .001
925 Dorsomedial prefrontal gyrus − 6 53 32 13.98 < .001
Supplementary motor area 9 17 65 10.82 < .001
56 Cerebellum [lobule IX (hem)] − 6 −
52
−
40
11.02 < .001
553 Thalamus [thalamus: prefrontal] 9 −
13
8 9.46 < .001
27 Cerebellum vermis [lobule I IV (hem)] 0 −
46
−
16
6.06 < .001
6 Middle cingulate cortex 0 −
16
41 5.44 .001
2 Middle frontal gyrus −
24
23 44 4.60 .025
Between-subject effects
Effect of age
Age: linear decrease Full 12 Medial temporal pole 51 2 −
19
5.04 .004
Age: linear decrease Youth 249 Superior parietal lobule [area 7P (SPL)] −
27
−
58
56 6.37 .000
207 Superior parietal lobule [area 7P (SPL)] 18 −
67
53 5.75 .000
Precuneus − 6 −
76
44 5.45 .001
Superior parietal lobule [area 7A (SPL)] 18 −
58
62 5.30 .002
35 Inferior parietal lobule [area hIP1 (IPS)] − − 38 5.14 .004
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ASD-related effects by sex. Likewise, follow-up analyses
do not suggest an impact of categorization accuracy on
the association between dmPFC and autism traits. See
Additional file 1 for detailed information on the results
of all control analyses.
Discussion
In this to date largest study on the neurofunctional
development of the social brain, we characterized so-
cial brain activation during mentalizing in a deeply
phenotyped sample of individuals with ASD and TD
controls. Besides showing a robust effect of task, we
demonstrate (1) that functional responses of core re-
gions of the social brain are well developed by the
age of 6 while age-related changes occur in a distrib-
uted set of brain regions typically implicated in at-
tention and executive control, (2) that categorical
case-control comparisons between TD and ASD par-
ticipants do not reveal clear-cut group differences in
mean and distribution of functional activation mea-
sures, and (3) that a dimensional analysis approach
might offer higher sensitivity to detect ASD-related
effects.
Robust effects of social animations on functional
activation
Across both groups, we replicated the effect of increased
activation in key regions of the social brain [7, 10] that
scaled with the mentalizing demands imposed by the an-
imations. Resulting activation patterns are highly similar
to those obtained from the comparison of the ToM con-
dition to the low-level baseline condition, which suggests
that effects are mainly driven by the ToM condition. Ac-
tivation was strongest in the bilateral pSTS and adjacent
temporal and occipital cortices, reflecting the central
role of sensory bottom-up processing in this task where
social meaning is extracted from the spatial constellation
of the moving shapes. We also observed robust
Table 3 Whole-brain parametric effects of increasing mentalizing demands on brain activation (Continued)
Effect/contrast Sample k Region x y z t pcorr
36 40
Inferior parietal lobule [area PFt (IPL)] −
48
−
34
41 4.78 .017
35 Inferior parietal lobule [area 2] 48 −
34
47 5.01 .007
13 Middle cingulate gyrus 6 26 38 4.85 .013
Anterior cingulate gyrus 6 32 26 4.60 .034
20 Superior frontal gyrus 24 − 1 47 4.83 .014
11 Anterior insula 30 20 − 4 4.77 .017
5 Supramarginal gyrus (area PFt (IPL)] 63 −
22
35 4.72 .021
8 Inferior parietal lobule [area 7PC (SPL)] 33 −
46
53 4.72 .021
2 Middle frontal gyrus 45 38 20 4.60 .034
1 Postcentral gyrus [area 4p] 33 −
31
50 4.57 .037
Effect of diagnosis (categorical)
No sign. effect
Effect of parent-reported autism traits (dimensional)
Linear increase Full (no TD
adult1)
4 Inferior parietal lobule [area PFm (IPL)] 54 −
55
38 4.82 .021
10SVC dmPFC (combined mask) 3 62 23 3.88 .011SVC
15SVC dmPFC (combined mask) − 9 53 38 3.49 .035SVC
Linear increase Youth 23SVC dmPFC (combined mask) 3 56 26 3.77 .016SVC
8SVC dmPFC (combined mask) −
15
50 35 3.43 .046SVC
Regions were classified according to the Automated Anatomical Labeling Atlas [47]. If applicable, functional labels were added in square brackets based on
Anatomical Probability Maps (Anatomy toolbox [48]). x-, y-, and z-coordinates (MNI) and statistical information refer to peak voxels in the identified clusters. p
values are adjusted for family-wise error correction for multiple comparisons across the whole brain, or across the combined mask of the right pSTS and dmPFC
using small volume correction (SVC). Age and sex were included as covariates in the analysis. SPL superior parietal lobule, IPS intraparietal sulcus, IPL inferior
parietal lobule, TD typically developing, pSTS posterior superior temporal sulcus, dmPFC dorsomedial prefrontal cortex
1 no parent-reported SRS-scores available for TD adults
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responses of the dmPFC, IFG, precuneus, and temporal
poles, as previously described [10, 29].
Effects of age
Across both groups, younger participants were less ac-
curate in video categorization. However, this age effect
in behavior was not reflected on the level of the social
brain circuitry where functional activation was largely
unaffected by age. This is in contrast to several studies
on mentalizing that reported higher social brain activa-
tion in younger subjects in various regions, such as med-
ial frontal, inferior frontal, or temporal areas (e.g., [46,
49–51]). Common interpretations are less efficient pro-
cessing or different cognitive strategies [52] that might
parallel ongoing structural maturation [53]. In our large
sample, however, these effects did not replicate, neither
across the full sample nor when splitting the sample into
two subsamples to approximate non-linear age effects,
and despite the fact that we had a 95% power to detect
small-to-moderate effects. An exception is the right tem-
poral pole that showed a gradual decrease of activation
from childhood to adulthood, potentially reflecting its
protracted structural development [53]. We propose two
explanations for the lack of age effects on social brain
activation. First, while previous reports were fairly con-
sistent in reporting stronger responses in younger indi-
viduals, they were less consistent in the localization of
these effects. For instance, medial prefrontal effects
ranged from subgenual to dorsal areas. This heterogen-
eity likely results from methodological differences and
limited statistical power, along with selection and report-
ing biases (e.g., [25, 44, 54–57]), which questions the
generalizability of previous findings [25]. Second, spon-
taneous mentalizing is a fundamentally basic skill akin
to tracking beliefs, an ability already seen in toddlers
([58, 59], but see [60] for a critical discussion). This sug-
gests an early development of its neurofunctional basis.
In fact, a recent study demonstrated the social brain net-
work to be functionally distinct and robustly recruited in
3-year-old children, independent from explicit mentaliz-
ing skills [61]. Similarly, a recent study in 50 children
and adolescents did not find an effect of age on several
measures of functional connectivity of the social brain
[62]. Overall, these and our findings suggest that across
study populations, the core neurofunctional network for
mentalizing is largely set by the age of 6 and does not
undergo gross changes from mid-childhood to adult-
hood. This does not preclude the existence of specific
developmental alterations in conditions like ASD, as dis-
cussed below.
Outside the social brain, however, we did observe an
effect of age. A distributed set of brain regions including
the frontal eye fields, intraparietal sulcus, and anterior
insula demonstrated a gradual decrease of activation
from childhood to early adulthood. These regions have
been identified as key hubs of the dorsal and ventral at-
tention systems that support top-down controlled
orienting of attention and bottom-up-mediated realloca-
tion of attention to salient events [63]. Age effects were
also evident in dorsolateral prefrontal areas that have
been suggested to support the flexible switch between
both attention systems [63]. According to our data, chil-
dren and young adolescents might recruit attentional re-
sources more strongly than older adolescents and adults
when inferring social meaning from the animated
shapes. Along with our observation of better task per-
formance in adults, these findings suggest an important
contribution of domain-general networks to social cog-
nition [64].
Effects of diagnosis
Contrary to our hypothesis, we did not observe robust
case-control differences in both behavioral measures of
mentalizing (i.e., categorization and narratives) and in
social brain responses to increasing levels of mental state
attribution. We also did not see a case-control difference
when comparing the ToM condition to the low-level
baseline condition. However, when comparing the ToM
condition to the goal-directed condition, one cluster
emerged within our dmPFC key region, showing a
higher average response in ASD, which was restricted to
the youth sample. Across these analyses, we did not see
major differences in the distributions of functional re-
sponses between cases and controls or any indication for
the formation of subgroups within the ASD sample. Be-
yond the categorical approach, we observed a moderate
and positive association between a continuous measure
of autistic traits and mentalizing-related activation in the
dmPFC. This association was only observed in the ASD
group and predicted higher brain responses in individ-
uals with higher autistic traits, irrespective of age.
The lack of robust case-control differences needs to
be discussed in the light of the positive findings by
Castelli et al. [7] and others using the animated
shapes task [12–14]. First, as discussed above in the
context of non-replicable age effects, one possible ex-
planation is that previously reported case-control dif-
ferences in studies with low statistical power reflect
idiosyncratic characteristics of the specific sample and
experimental procedure. A recent study using simu-
lated and empirical fMRI data provided compelling
evidence that between-subject effects, such as case-
control differences and brain-behavior relationships,
are usually weak and spatially distributed [44]. It is
plausible that ASD-related effects generally also follow
this weak and diffuse pattern. As a result, commonly
used sample sizes in earlier ASD studies (n = 10–30),
which were sufficiently powered to detect strong and
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localized within-subject effects (e.g., effect of an ex-
perimental condition), might have lacked the statis-
tical power to detect robust effects related to ASD. A
consequence of this power failure is an overestimation
of effect sizes, including spurious effects due to ran-
dom error, which produced a heterogeneous pattern
of putative ASD-related effects that do not replicate
in follow-up studies. Second, the continuous revision
of diagnostic criteria and the fact that the autism
diagnosis is not stationary over time might further
impact the comparability to older studies [65]. A
third explanation is that earlier findings obtained in
smaller, more homogeneous, and potentially more se-
verely affected samples might relate to specific sub-
samples, or “strata”, within the ASD population. The
LEAP cohort was purposely sampled to enable in-
depth experimental characterization of potential bio-
markers (including MRI scans) and therefore excluded
individuals with low IQ (< 50) and most likely indi-
viduals with the most severe autistic presentations.
However, the sample does allow us to investigate the
heterogeneity of the ASD population with respect to
age, sex, comorbidities, and symptom profiles. In the
current study, we have not leveraged this heterogen-
eity for stratification purposes yet, but tested for dif-
ferences in average response while controlling for
these sources of variance, which might have resulted
in reduced sensitivity for subsample-specific effects.
For instance, despite covering the full range of symp-
tom severity, the LEAP cohort is, on average, rather
mildly affected, which might have contributed to the
negative findings in case-control comparisons. How-
ever, our control analysis restricted to more severely
affected individuals (see section 6.8 in the Additional
file 1) did not change the results, which is not con-
sistent with this potential explanation for our negative
findings, at least in our sample. Fourth, despite exten-
sive standard operation procedures, the multi-site ac-
quisition design is a potential source of unwanted
variance which might have similarly resulted in re-
duced sensitivity for smaller-sized effects [66]. We ad-
dressed this variance in our analyses which did not
suggest a systematic confounding effect of site. Fifth,
in contrast to Castelli et al. [7], participants were
prompted to focus on the category of the animation,
which introduces an explicit component to this other-
wise implicit, or “spontaneous,” mentalizing task. It
has been suggested that spontaneous mentalizing is
the key difference between autism and typical devel-
opment and that individuals with ASD can explicitly
mentalize when prompted to do so [2]. The explicit
categorization might therefore have reduced, or even
abolished, mentalizing-related case-control differences
in our study [67]. While this interpretation needs to
be tested in future large-scale studies, it is challenged
by earlier reports of behavioral case-control differ-
ences using the prompted categorization approach
[13, 27]. In addition, our analyses suggest a significant
association between prompted categorization and a
measure of spontaneous mentalizing in the same indi-
viduals. Finally, the intriguingly simplistic yet power-
ful effect of the animated shapes is hypothesized to
originate from an efficient, early developing mentaliz-
ing system that offers little room for manipulation by
explicit strategies [9, 58], which is supported by neu-
rofunctional evidence in TD participants [45].
Our categorical approach of comparing cases and con-
trols therefore does not lend support to the hypothesis
that social brain function during mentalizing elicited by
animated shapes is a one-to-one correlate of social im-
pairments in individuals with ASD. That said, however,
both categorical and dimensional analyses converged on
two small-to-moderate effects in our dmPFC key region.
The mentalizing-specific activation in the dmPFC was
stronger in younger individuals with ASD compared to
TD individuals. Similarly, dmPFC activation increased
with the degree to which an individual with ASD dem-
onstrates autistic behavior as assessed by parent-
reported autistic traits. While counterintuitive at first
sight, a possible explanation is a greater need for a com-
pensatory recruitment of the dmPFC in younger individ-
uals and with increasing autism traits, an effect that was
recently introduced as “camouflaging” in the context of
mentalizing [68]. This interpretation is also in line with
the absence of a dimensional effect in TD individuals, al-
though this seems to be primarily due to the limited
variance in autism trait scores. Supplemental analyses do
not suggest an association of dmPFC responses with
categorization accuracy, which can similarly be recon-
ciled with the hypothesis of successful camouflaging. We
acknowledge, however, that caution is warranted when
interpreting our dimensional finding since our control
analyses point to a potential effect of site and since this
association occurs within the neurotypical range, as sug-
gested by the lack of an overall case-control difference.
Further studies are needed to follow up on this finding
and its potential biological meaning.
What does our observation of largely overlapping so-
cial brain responses in individuals with ASD and TD in-
dividuals add to current theories of autism? The
animated shapes task is hypothesized to mainly draw
upon implicit mentalizing which is required for fast-
paced real-life interactions [9, 58] and which is sug-
gested to be specifically impaired in autistic individuals
[2]. With the caveat of an explicit component introduced
by the prompted categorization, our results provide no
evidence of an altered recruitment of its neural corre-
lates in autism, at least in terms of a consistent alteration
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in the strength of activation. This leaves open the possi-
bility of idiosyncratic, non-converging alterations in
brain activation which is not captured by conventional
fMRI analyses based on group means [65, 69]. Likewise,
the dysconnectivity account of autism postulates alter-
ations in functional connectivity to underlie behavioral
and clinical impairments [70]. Measures of functional
connectivity and their modulation by mentalizing de-
mands might therefore be more promising for biomarker
research. Additional, likely multiple, causes might con-
tribute to the exacerbation of socio-communicative im-
pairments of autistic individuals in everyday life. These
may include cascading effects of impairments in other
domains (e.g., sensory abnormalities [71]), a lower pro-
pensity to adopt the intentional stance [72], reduced mo-
tivational salience of social and non-social stimuli [73],
or direct or indirect effects of comorbid conditions (e.g.,
alexithymia [74]).
Limitations
Despite an extensive set of control analyses, we can-
not rule out additional sources of variance that re-
main unaddressed or poorly addressed, such as
specific effects of medication, and might thereby pre-
vent the detection of effects of interest despite our
well-powered sample. Regarding sample characteris-
tics, we acknowledge that the proportion of more se-
verely affected individuals was comparatively low.
We also did not include individuals with low IQ (<
50), which is a common limitation in imaging stud-
ies where experimental demands are too burdening
for low-functioning individuals. This restriction com-
promises the heterogeneity of the LEAP cohort and
its representativeness for the ASD population. Re-
garding our experimental protocol, this task uses
graded levels of mental state attribution as a correl-
ate for ToM, which might be less sensitive to cap-
ture specific effects of mentalizing on the neural and
behavioral level. Small methodological differences to
the original study by Castelli et al. [7] might have
contributed to the lack of case-control differences on
the behavioral level (e.g., use of 3-point instead of 6-
point scale for obtaining narrative scores). Overall,
the pattern of strong within-subject effects and
small-to-absent between-subject effects might partly
result from substantial between-subject heterogen-
eity, which may be exacerbated in multicenter de-
signs, but is a feature of samples that strive for
representativeness for the underlying population.
While this is the case for the current study, we
followed recommended procedures to ensure optimal
alignment of data acquisition between centers [66]
and aimed for a deep multimodal characterization of
our study participants [24, 37]. Furthermore, our
distributional observations do not support the inter-
pretation of distinct subgroups of participants with
ASD masking group mean effects.
Conclusions
In the current report, we examined social brain corre-
lates of mentalizing in ASD in a large and well-powered
task-based fMRI dataset. Developmental effects were ob-
served in younger individuals who showed a stronger
modulation of attention-related brain areas by mentaliz-
ing demands. Against our expectation, we did not repli-
cate previous observations of reduced activation in
individuals with ASD. Instead, brain responses in autistic
individuals were robustly typical in that they showed the
expected effects of task in the social brain circuitry. We
therefore conclude that time-locked functional activation
in an animated shapes task does not inform the neuro-
biological basis of the mind-blindness account of ASD.
This calls for the interrogation of different neural phe-
notypes, in particular connectivity and connectomic
measures such as those derived from graph theory,
which may access brain functional interaction not cap-
tured by the activation measures investigated here. Fur-
thermore, our work clearly demonstrates the importance
of novel research strategies that go beyond case-control
comparisons but rather target the heterogeneity in ASD
itself (e.g., [65]), an opportunity that is offered by large-
scale data sets such as LEAP.
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